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6.1  Introduction 
The alternative minimum tax (AMT) was designed as part of the Tax Reform 
Act of  1986 in response to concerns that a number of firms that reported posi- 
tive “book” profits to their shareholders paid no corporate tax to the federal 
government. A corporation is required to calculate its tax liability under both 
the regular tax rules and the AMT rules, and it pays tax according to the system 
that results in the largest income tax liability. 
The AMT rules potentially affect multinational  corporations (MNCs) in a 
manner quite different from their effect on domestic corporations. First, the 
taxable income of domestic corporations (and that of the domestic operations 
of MNCs) is generally increased due to restrictions on deductions under the 
AMT and the inclusion of certain income that would be excluded from taxation 
under the regular tax. However, for foreign operations, deductions are quite 
similar for AMT and regular tax purposes. 
Second, although the domestic tax base is generally larger under the AMT 
than under the regular tax, the tax rate on all AMT income is 20 percent rather 
than the 34 or 35 percent rate that generally applies to corporations under the 
regular tax system.’ As a result, whether a firm pays tax under the AMT de- 
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1. The 1993 Omnibus Reconciliation Act increased the regular corporate tax rate to 35 percent 
for firms with taxable income in excess of $10 million, effective January 1,  1993. The 34 percent 
tax rate from the prior law continues to begin at a taxable income of $75,000. Phaseouts of the 
benefit of lower graduated rates under the regular tax create marginal tax rates of 39  and 38 percent 
for certain narrow ranges of income. There is no change in the AMT tax rate for corporations. 
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pends on the particular sources of income and types of deductions received by 
the firm. For U.S.-based  MNCs, the lower marginal rate of taxation under the 
AMT may present the firm a timing opportunity to repatriate income from low- 
tax foreign countries. Repatriated income is less likely to be subject to U.S. 
tax, or will be subject to a smaller amount of tax, because foreign tax credits 
can shelter a greater percentage of taxable income. 
Third, a separate AMT provision limits the total amount of tax that may be 
offset through foreign tax credits. For a firm for which this provision is a bind- 
ing constraint, positive amounts of U.S. tax will be paid on repatriated divi- 
dends even if the firm would otherwise have excess foreign tax credits. 
The AMT affects a significant number of firms.*  In 1990 the corporate AMT 
accounted for 8.5 percent of corporate tax receipts, or $8.1 billion3 Including 
regular taxes paid by these AMT firms, AMT firms paid 21.4 percent of all 
corporate income tax. Approximately 25 percent of corporations with assets in 
excess of  $50 million paid AMT. Among the largest firms, those with assets in 
excess of $500 million, the proportion of firms paying AMT was 30.6 percent. 
Among multinational firms, AMT incidence is slightly more prevalent. This 
is partly due to the correlation between firm size and AMT liability  and the 
fact that the largest firms are more likely to receive foreign-source in~ome.~ 
Among firms in 1990 filing form 11  18-the  form on which foreign tax credits 
are calculated-28  percent of those with assets in excess of $50 million paid 
AMT. Among these multinationals with assets in excess of $500 million, 33.3 
percent  paid AMT. Of  all form 1118 filers, 53 percent  of  all assets and 56 
percent of all foreign-source income was accounted for by corporations pay- 
ing AMT. 
The existence of  the AMT can affect a multinational firm in a number of 
different ways, from the design of dividend repatriation strategies to locational 
choice of real investment. In this paper we outline how incentives can be af- 
fected by the AMT and present data suggestive of how important these effects 
may be. 
The next section of the paper describes the mechanics of calculating AMT 
and the limitations placed on the use of foreign tax credits against AMT. Sec- 
tion  6.3 considers the relative investment  incentives for locating investment 
domestically and abroad for an AMT firm. Section 6.4 examines the incentives 
2. Gerardi, Milner, and Silverstein (1994) present data on the coverage of the corporate AMT 
from 1987 to 1991. 
3.  The actual effect on revenues may be greater because most business credits (such as the R&D 
tax credit) may  not be claimed by  firms on the AMT, and regular tax firms may not use these 
credits or the AMT credit to reduce their regular tax liability below the floor created by the AMT. 
The denied credits do not show up in the data as additional tax payments, but are carried forward 
into future years by  the firms. As discussed in Lyon (1991). the AMT also affects total revenue 
collections by changing behavior. To the extent that tax-favored investments are discouraged rela- 
tive to other investments, total revenue collections may be higher under the regular tax. 
4.  E.g., even in the largest asset category, form 11  18 filers  constitute 24.1 percent of the corpora- 
tions, but account for 47.7 percent of the assets in the largest asset category. 155  Alternative Minimum Tax 
for repatriating foreign-source income under the AMT. In section 6.5, tax re- 
turn data of corporations are examined to analyze the prevalence of AMT sta- 
tus among U.S.-based multinationals, their receipt of  foreign-source income, 
and the tax prices faced by  these firms on additional repatriations of foreign- 
source income. A concluding section summarizes the findings and suggests 
directions for continuing research in this area. 
6.2  Determination of AMT 
A firm calculates its AMT by making a number of modifications to its tax- 
able income reported for regular tax purposes. Here we briefly describe the 
steps in calculating AMT (summarized in table 6.1). More detail on the most 
important modifications is provided below. 
The starting point for computation of the AMT is the firm’s regular taxable 
income before any deduction for net operating losses (NOL). To this amount, 
the firm adds back a number of deductions that are restricted under the AMT 
and certain sources of income not taxable under the regular tax rules (adjust- 
ments and preferences). NOL deductions may offset up to 90 percent of  this 
sum. Subtracting allowable NOL deductions results in alternative minimum 
taxable income (AMTI). AMTI is then reduced by  subtracting an exemption 
amount (a maximum amount of $40,000, phased out ratably to zero for firms 
with AMTI between $150,000 and $3 10,000).  Tax is calculated by multiplying 
this net amount by  the 20 percent AMT tax rate. Tax  may  be reduced by  a 
limited amount of AMT foreign tax credits, as described in more detail below. 
This yields the firm’s tentative minimum tax. Tentative minimum tax is com- 
Table 6.1  AMT Calculation 














Regular taxable income, before NOL 
+ Adjustments and preferences (including ACE) 
= Taxable income before NOL 
-  AMT NOL (up to 90 percent of line 3) 
= AMTI 
-  Exemption amount 
= AMTI net of exemptions 
X 20 percent 
= AMT before credits 
-  Allowable AMT foreign tax credits 
(i) U.S.  tax X (Foreign income)/(Worldwide income) 
(ii) 90 percent limitation 
= Tentative minimum tax 
-  Regular tax (before all credits except foreign tax credit and possessions tax credit) 
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pared to regular income tax before all credits except the foreign tax credit and 
the possessions tax credit. If  tentative minimum tax exceeds this amount of 
regular tax liability, the excess is payable as AMT, in addition to the firm’s 
payment of  its regular tax liability. Each dollar of AMT payments creates a 
dollar of AMT credits that may be used in future years only against regular 
income tax liability. AMT credits may not be used to reduce regular tax liabil- 
ity below tentative minimum tax. 
6.2.1  Adjustments and Preferences 
A number of adjustments and preferences are added back to regular taxable 
income to derive AMTI. The most notable of  these are the adjustments for 
depreciation and adjusted current earnings (ACE). These two adjustments are 
examined in detail. Other adjustments and preferences include amortization of 
pollution control facilities, amortization of mining and development costs, ba- 
sis adjustments in determining gain or loss from the sale of property, income 
from long-term contracts and installment sales, merchant marine capital con- 
struction funds, depletion deductions, certain tax-exempt interest income, in- 
tangible drilling costs, and bad debt reserves of financial institutions. 
Depreciation 
For domestic assets placed in service after 1986, recovery periods under the 
AMT are equal to the asset’s class life (asset depreciation range [ADR] mid- 
point). These recovery periods can be up to twice as long as those provided 
under the regular tax. Depreciation deductions for equipment are calculated 
using the 150 percent declining-balance method switching to straight line. Un- 
der the regular tax, most equipment qualifies for the more accelerated depreci- 
ation method of  200 percent declining balance switching to straight line. De- 
preciation deductions under the AMT are also limited by  the adjustment for 
ACE, described below. 
For property used abroad by  a branch or a foreign subsidiary, depreciation 
deductions are the same for regular tax and AMT purposes. Foreign-use prop- 
erty of a branch is depreciated using the straight-line method over the asset’s 
class life. For property held by a foreign subsidiary, the “earnings and profits” 
method is used under both the AMT and regular tax (this method results in 
depreciation allowances similar to those used for a foreign bran~h).~ 
Adjusted Current Earnings 
The adjustment for ACE is based on the calculation of earnings and profits. 
For taxable years after 1989, if ACE exceeds AMTI before NOL and before 
the ACE adjustment, AMTI is increased by 75 percent of the difference.h 
5. Earnings and profits is a separate measure of  income used to determine the portion of  a 
dividend deemed to be paid out of earnings and the portion paid out of capital. Earnings and profits 
is also used in the calculation of the ACE adjustment as explained below. 
6. If  ACE is less than  AMTI, AMTI may be reduced by 75 percent of this difference, but not by 157  Alternative Minimum Tax 
ACE includes items of income not included in AMTI, such as tax-exempt 
interest, and ACE does not allow certain deductions, such as the dividends- 
received deduction. 
For domestic property placed in service in 1990-93,  depreciation is calcu- 
lated using the straight-line method over the asset’s class life. There is no addi- 
tional ACE depreciation adjustment for foreign-use property. 
Prior to 1990, a book income adjustment was used instead of ACE. Under 
the book income adjustment, taxable income was increased by 50 percent of 
the  difference between book income and AMTI  calculated without regard 
to the book income adjustment and before NOL. 
6.2.2  Allowable AMT Foreign Tax Credit 
AMT foreign tax credits differ from the foreign tax credits claimed by the 
taxpayer against regular income tax, although the process of calculating them 
is similar. Under both the regular tax and the AMT, the foreign tax credit that 
may be claimed in a given year is limited to the amount of U.S. tax that would 
have been paid on the foreign income. This limitation is calculated separately 
for each income category or “basket.” 
The U.S. tax that would have been paid on the foreign income is calculated 
by multiplying (1) the ratio of foreign income to worldwide income by  (2)  the 
taxpayer’s U.S.  tax liability (before use of foreign tax credits). Under the AMT, 
foreign income, worldwide income, and US.  tax liability used in this calcula- 
tion are all calculated using the AMT rules. The U.S.  component of worldwide 
income will differ from that used in the regular tax computation chiefly be- 
cause of the various adjustments and preferences described above. Foreign in- 
come will vary to a lesser extent because the depreciation deductions taken for 
foreign-use property under the regular tax rules are the same as under the AMT. 
Differences in the apportionment of certain expenses jointly allocable between 
domestic and foreign-source income may cause other differences in the ratio 
of foreign income to worldwide income under the AMT. For example, interest 
expense is generally allocated in proportion to the tax basis of domestic and 
foreign assets. The tax basis of domestic assets will be higher under the AMT 
than under the regular tax since depreciation deductions are taken more slowly. 
The tax basis of foreign assets is generally the same under the AMT as under 
the regular tax. As a result, a greater share of interest expense is domestically 
sourced under the AMT than under the regular tax.’ 
~ 
more than the amount by which AMTI was increased in prior years due to the ACE adjustment. 
The 1993 act repeals the ACE depreciation adjustment beginning in 1994. 
7. The characterization of income across the limitation categories differs between the AMT and 
the regular tax for certain types of passive income. Certain income that would otherwise be placed 
in the passive income category is placed in the general limitation category if it is highly taxed. 
Income is determined to be highly taxed if the foreign tax rate on such income exceeds the regular 
corporate tax rate (for purposes of regular tax computation) or the AMT tax rate (for purposes of 
AMT calculation). 158  Andrew B. Lyon and Gerald Silverstein 
After computing the foreign tax credits for each separate limitation category 
using AMT rules, a second, overall limitation is applied on the amount of for- 
eign tax credits that may be used against AMT. The combined use of NOL 
deductions and AMT foreign tax credits may not reduce tentative minimum 
tax by more than 90 percent. AMT foreign tax credits denied as a result of the 
90 percent limitation are treated like other excess foreign tax credits, and may 
be carried back two years and carried forward five years to offset tentative 
minimum tax. 
The following example illustrates the operation of the 90 percent limitation 
under the AMT. Assume the firm has regular tax liability before any credits of 
$510,000 and regular foreign tax credits of $500,000. In the absence of  the 
AMT the firm would have total U.S. tax liability of $10,000. Now assume that 
for AMT purposes, the firm has AMT NOL deductions of $250,000 (line 4 of 
table 6. l), AMT before credits of  $450,000 (line 9 of  table 6. I), and AMT 
foreign tax credits before application of the 90 percent limitation of $410,000. 
Together the use of AMT NOL deductions and AMT foreign tax credits cannot 
reduce the firm’s tentative minimum tax by more than 90 percent of the amount 
that would occur in the absence of  NOLs  and foreign tax credits. The AMT 
NOL deductions have the effect of reducing the firm’s tentative minimum tax 
by $50,000 ($250,000 X 0.20), so that in the absence of NOLs and foreign tax 
credits, tentative minimum tax would be $500,000.  The combined use of NOLs 
and foreign tax credits may not reduce tentative minimum tax below $50,000 
(a 90 percent reduction). As a result, only $400,000 of AMT foreign tax credits 
may be used. Tentative minimum tax is $50,000,  and AMT payment is $40,000 
in addition to the $10,000 payment of regular tax liability. 
AMT payment does not change the characterization of  the firm’s regular 
foreign tax credits. The firm is assumed to have used $500,000 in regular for- 
eign tax credits, creating neither a carryback nor a carryforward situation for 
regular tax purposes. Any of  the firm’s AMT foreign tax credits denied as a 
result of either the operation of the separate limitations or the 90 percent limi- 
tation may be carried back two years to offset prior years’ tentative minimum 
tax and up to five years forward to offset future tentative minimum tax. The 
AMT payment of $40,000 creates $40,000 in AMT credits that may be used in 
future years to offset regular tax. 
6.3  Incentives Affecting Capital Investment 
As described above, the depreciation deduction for foreign-use property is 
the same for both regular tax and AMT purposes. Whereas for domestic prop- 
erty the AMT generally creates a tax penalty for new investment undertaken 
by an AMT firm relative to the incentives faced by a regular tax firm, the oppo- 
site may be the case for foreign-use property.* Under the AMT, a firm claims 
8. While firms currently on the AMT are likely to have reduced incentives for domestic invest- 
ment. the overall effect of the AMT on domestic investment is more difficult to ascertain. This is 159  Alternative Minimum Tax 
the  same depreciation  deductions  as it  would  for regular  tax  purposes  for 
foreign-use property, but income generated by the investment can be taxed at 
only 20 percent  under  the AMT rather  than  the  34 or 35  percent  tax  rate 
applying under the regular tax system. If this were the only difference between 
the regular and AMT systems, a firm permanently on the AMT must have a 
lower cost of capital for foreign-use property than a regular tax firm: The tax- 
able income of the property is the same, but the AMT rate is lower. 
As a result, under these assumptions, foreign-use property is treated more 
favorably under the AMT than under the regular tax, while domestic property 
is treated less favorably under the AMT than under the regular tax. The AMT 
rules  thus  create  an  unambiguous  reduction  in  the  price  of  investment  in 
foreign-use equipment relative to domestic-use equipment. 
Several elaborations to this analysis can be made. First, if the foreign coun- 
try's rate of tax on the investment exceeds the U.S.  regular rate of tax, then the 
foreign investment  creates excess tax  credits. For a firm permanently  in an 
excess credit position, the foreign country's tax rate is the effective rate of tax 
on this investment. However, because domestic investment is still discouraged 
under the AMT relative to the regular tax, the price of foreign-use equipment 
relative to domestic-use equipment is still lower for an AMT firm than for a 
regular tax firm. 
Second, the cost of financing investment for an AMT firm is likely to be 
higher than for a regular tax firm when debt finance is used. This is because 
interest payments are deductible at the corporate statutory tax rate (34 or 35 
percent for a regular tax firm and 20 percent for an AMT firm).  The after-tax 
cost of a dollar of interest payments thus rises from 65 or 66 cents to 80 cents 
on the AMT.9 Thus, while  the  absolute cost of  debt-financed investment  is 
higher on the AMT, the price of foreign investment relative to U.S. investment 
is still lower for the AMT firm. 
The price of foreign investment relative to domestic investment can be calcu- 
lated for an AMT firm and for a regular tax firm. Because the assumption of 
permanent AMT liability is likely to be an extreme one, the relative incentives 
for domestic and foreign investment for firms only temporarily on the AMT 
should be compared with the incentives faced by regular tax firms.'O The calcu- 
because the AMT also has an effect on firms that are currently paying regular tax but that anticipate 
a future period of AMT liability. These firms may have greater investment incentives currently 
than if they were to remain permanently on the regular tax. See Lyon (1990) for a discussion. The 
example discussed in the text considers incentives of firms currently subject to the AMT. 
9. The loss in the value of the interest deductions under the AMT serves to increase the AMT 
credit a firm may claim in the future. 
10. Gerardi et al. (1994) present data on the duration of AMT liability for firms between 1987 
and 1991. Among a selected panel of AMT payers, 70 percent of taxpayers had AMT liability for 
two or  fewer years of the five years in the panel. This calculation tends to understate the time 
period over which firms are affected by the incentives of the AMT for two reasons. First, many 
firms incurred liability in  1990 and 1991, and the length of time these firms will remain on the 
AMT is still unknown. Second, AMT credits may not be used to reduce regular tax liability below 
tentative minimum tax liability. Firms unable to fully use AMT credits against regular tax effec- 160  Andrew B. Lyon and Gerald Silverstein 
Table 6.2  Marginal Effective Tax Rates for Domestic (U.S.) and Foreign-Use 
Property (%) 
Five-Year  Ten-Year 
Asset  Location  Regular Tax  Temporary AMT  Temporary AMT 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Equipment  U.S.  26.8  32.5  33.0 
Foreign-use  38.3  36.8  33.3 
Structures  U.S.  35.6  35.0  33.3 
Foreign-use  37.8  36.9  35.0 
Source; Authors’ calculations. 
Nore: See text for assumptions. 
lations below assume that the firm is in excess limitation status for foreign tax 
credits, that the investment is equity financed so that there is no change in the 
firm’s discount rate, and that all income flows (both receipts and deductions) 
on the foreign investment are immediately repatriated to the U.S. parent (as 
would occur if the property were held by  a foreign branch). The corporate 
marginal effective tax rate is calculated separately for an aggregate category 
of equipment and for commercial structures using the tax rules in effect from 
1990 to 1992.” 
Table 6.2 compares the corporate marginal effective tax rates for equipment 
and structures under permanent regular tax status and temporary five-year or 
ten-year initial periods of AMT liability.I2  For equipment located in the United 
States, a regular tax firm faces a marginal effective tax rate of 26.8 percent. 
The same investment located abroad faces a 38.3 percent effective tax rate 
under the regular tax system. In terms of the cost of capital net of depreciation, 
this is an increase of 18.6 percent. For a firm with an initial five-year period of 
AMT liability, equipment located in the United States has a marginal effective 
tax rate of 32.5 percent. For this AMT firm, the effective tax rate on foreign- 
use equipment is 36.8 percent. The cost of  capital net of depreciation for the 
foreign investment relative to the domestic investment increases by 6.8 percent. 
tively face the same marginal incentives as firms paying AMT. Between  1987 and  1990, $17.2 
billion was paid in AMT, but AMT credits claimed between  1988 and 1991 totaled only $3.4 
billion. 
11. It is assumed that economic depreciation of the investment follows a geometric pattern, so 
that returns on the investment each period are proportional to its remaining value. Rates of depreci- 
ation are based on estimates by Hulten and Wykoff (1981). Annual inflation is assumed to be 3.8 
percent, and the after-tax real rate of return is 5 percent. The cost of capital for equipment is based 
on a capital-stock weighted average of the cost of capital for 31 types of equipment. These and 
other assumptions follow Lyon (1990). The corporate marginal effective tax rate is calculated as 
(p -  s) / p, where p is the cost of capital net of depreciation and s is the after-tax real return. 
12. The period of temporary AMT liability includes both the period during which the firm is 
paying AMT and the period during which it uses up its AMT credits. Because AMT credits may 
not reduce regular tax liability below tentative minimum tax, a firm does not face the incentives 
of the regular tax system until past AMT credits are exhausted. 161  Alternative Minimum Tax 
Finally, for the firm facing a ten-year temporary period of AMT liability, the 
marginal effective tax rate for domestic equipment is 33.0 percent, while it is 
33.3 percent for foreign-use equipment. The cost of capital net of depreciation 
for foreign-use property relative to domestic-use property is only 0.45 percent 
higher for this firm. 
This analysis suggests that the AMT creates a relative incentive to locate 
investment abroad rather than in the United States. Of  course, it can also be 
seen from the table that foreign-use property is always treated less preferen- 
tially than domestic property for a firm facing a given tax system. Thus, it is 
not correct to say that the AMT creates an absolute incentive to invest abroad 
rather than domestically. Rather, it is the incentive relative to the regular tax 
system  that  favors  foreign-use  equipment  investment  over  domestic  in- 
vestment. 
Table 6.2 shows that for investments in structures, the marginal effective tax 
rate is very similar for both AMT firms and regular tax firms. Even here, the 
increase in the cost of capital for foreign investment relative to domestic invest- 
ment is slightly smaller for AMT firms than for regular tax firms, reinforcing 
the results found for equipment investment. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the cost-of-capital calculations pre- 
sented here are based on a specific set of assumptions  that may not be generally 
applicable. In particular, it was assumed that earnings of the foreign subsidiary 
were repatriated immediately. Because such income may be deferred for U.S. 
tax purposes, the tax status of the firm at the time of the investment may not 
affect the cost of capital of foreign-use  property. Rather, the tax rate of the firm 
at the time of repatriation may be more re1e~ant.l~  However, even in the case 
where the cost of capital of foreign-use equipment is the same for regular and 
AMT purposes, the fact that the cost of capital of domestic-use equipment is 
increased on the AMT relative to the regular tax creates a relative incentive for 
AMT  firms to undertake investment abroad at the expense of  domestic in- 
vestment. 
6.4  Income Repatriation Incentives 
The differences in statutory rates and foreign tax credit calculations create 
the potential for AMT firms to face different incentives for the receipt of 
foreign-source income than if they were subject to only the regular tax. Hines 
and Hubbard (1990), Altshuler and Newlon (1993), and Altshuler, Newlon, 
and Randolph (chap. 9 in this volume) have shown that firms take advantage 
of  deferral and timing opportunities to reduce their global tax liabilities on 
foreign-source  income. This section considers the different tax positions faced 
by an AMT firm and its incentive to receive foreign-source income. 
13. The next section examines whether the AMT presents an opportunity for repatriating such 
income. 162  Andrew B. Lyon and Gerald Silverstein 
A number of potential tax situations might be considered in evaluating the 
incentive for dividend repatriation and deferral. The variety of tax situations is 
somewhat larger under the AMT than for regular tax purposes, because  the 
firm’s regular foreign tax credit position-i.e.,  whether it is in excess credit or 
excess limit-may  not be the same as its position under the AMT. In addition, 
the firm may be in an excess credit position under the AMT due to either the 
separate  income  category  limitations  or the 90 percent  limitation,  each  of 
which may result in a different incentive for repatriation. 
Before considering the foreign tax implications of the AMT, it may be useful 
to examine the effects of  an AMT firm earning additional income in the ab- 
sence of  foreign tax interactions. Consider a firm that receives  an additional 
dollar of  income that is fully included in both minimum taxable income and 
regular taxable income. The net effect of this income on overall current-year 
tax liabilities is an increase in tax payments of 20 cents, and a decrease in the 
firm’s AMT credits of  14 cents. This  result can be derived  as follows:  The 
additional dollar of income increases the firm’s regular tax liability by 34 cents 
(assuming it is subject to the 34 percent marginal tax rate) and increases the 
firm’s tentative minimum tax by 20 cents. Because AMT is defined as the dif- 
ference between regular tax payments and tentative minimum tax, AMT falls 
by  14 cents. The net increase of  20 cents is the sum of the increase in regular 
tax liability and the decrease in AMT. 
Now consider the same situation, but in addition assume that the firm had 
AMT NOL deductions that were restricted by the 90  percent limitation. In this 
case, an additional dollar of income would cause the firm’s net tax payments 
to increase by 2 cents. This is because the firm’s regular tax would increase by 
34 cents (assuming the firm  is subject to this regular tax rate), but the firm’s 
tentative  minimum tax would increase by  only 2 cents. (The dollar of  addi- 
tional taxable income would allow the use of an additional 90 cents in AMT 
NOLs. AMTI would increase by  10 cents, and tentative minimum tax would 
increase by 0.20 X 10  cents.) AMT would decline by 32 cents, reducing future 
AMT credits by 32 cents.I4 
Next we consider foreign tax credit interactions and their effect on AMT lia- 
bilities. 
6.4.1  Excess Credit Positions 
Initially we assume the firm is in an excess credit position for both regular 
tax and AMT calculations. An AMT firm  could be in excess credit either be- 
cause of the conventional limitation on foreign tax credits based on the ratio 
14. If the firm  had a tax loss for regular tax purposes, current tax liability would still increase 
by  2 cents. In this case the 2 cents would be  from the AMT payment, so AMT credits would 
increase by 2 cents. The additional dollar of income would not change regular tax liability, but it 
would reduce by one dollar the amount of regular NOL carried forward. The reduction in regular 
NOL carryforwards can be thought to increase future regular tax liability by  34 cents, provided 
the NOL carryforward period would not have otherwise expired. 163  Alternative Minimum Tax 
Table 6.3  Tax Cost of Dividend Repatriation: Excess Credit Position on 
Regular Tax 
Regular FK  AMT FTC 
Position  Current Tax Price  Carryforwards  AMT Credit  Carryforwards 
1. Regular tax firm  0  F -  .34  n.a.  n.a. 
AMT position 
2. Excess credit  0  F -  .34  0  F -  .20 
3. 90 Percent 
limitation  .02  F -  .34  .02  F -  .I8 
4. Excess limit  .20 -  T*  T* -  .34  .20 -  P  n.a. 
of foreign to worldwide income or because of  the 90 percent limitation. We 
consider both cases below. 
Ninety Percent Limitation Not Binding 
We assume that for regular tax purposes the firm is subject to the 34 percent 
tax rate. Under the regular tax, an additional dollar of earnings repatriated re- 
sults in no additional regular tax payments, and the stock of regular foreign tax 
credits carried to another year increases by P  -  0.34, where P  is the foreign 
tax payment on this income.I5 
Similarly for AMT purposes, assuming the 90 percent limitation is not bind- 
ing, the additional dollar of earnings repatriations results in no additional AMT 
and the stock of AMT foreign tax credits carried to another year increases by 
r* -  0.20. 
If the firm was also in excess credit for the previous two years, the foreign 
tax credits must be carried forward for up to five years. If  T* is less than 0.34, 
the firm has reduced the amount of regular tax credits it must carry forward. If 
P  is greater than 0.34, the only cost to a regular tax  firm of  the earnings 
repatriation is if the additional regular foreign tax credit carryforward created 
will not be used in the next five years. In this case, the firm might have been 
better off deferring receipt of the foreign earnings until a time when the foreign 
tax credit could offset regular tax. The same incentives should generally guide 
an AMT firm. The AMT firm, however, should consider its ability to use both 
its regular and AMT foreign tax carryforwards in future years.I6 
Rows 1 and 2 of table 6.3 summarize these tax price effects for firms in an 
excess credit position under both the regular tax and the AMT. 
15. It is assumed that the foreign country has a classical corporate  income tax system. See 
Altshuler and Newlon (1993) for variations on the tax price measure under split-rate and imputa- 
tion corporate tax systems. The effect on worldwide tax liability of withholding taxes, which may 
be imposed by the foreign country when income is repatriated, is not specifically considered here. 
Tax prices examined in this section are based on tax payments to the United States. 
16. The scenario becomes a little more complicated for a firm  in an excess credit position under 
only one of the two parallel tax systems. This possibility is examined in more detail later. 164  Andrew B. Lyon and Gerald Silverstein 
Ninety Percent Limit Binding 
The firm is assumed  to be in excess credit for regular  tax purposes. For 
AMT purposes, the firm is assumed to be marginally constrained from using 
additional AMT foreign tax credits because of the 90 percent limitation."  For 
regular tax purposes, the effect of an additional dollar of earnings repatriated 
is the same as above, resulting in no current tax liability. Under the AMT, how- 
ever, the additional dollar of repatriated earnings increases AMT before credits 
(line 9 of table 6.1) by 20 cents. Only an additional I8 cents of AMT foreign 
tax credits may be used to offset this tax, so tentative minimum tax increases 
by 2 cents. Because current regular tax liability is unchanged by the receipt of 
these earnings, AMT increases by 2 cents and a 2-cent AMT credit is gener- 
ated.  AMT  foreign  tax  credits  carried  to  another  year  increase  by 
Relative to the case in which the 90 percent limitation is not binding, there 
is a  diminished  incentive  to repatriate  earnings.  This is  true  regardless  of 
whether the marginal dividend is from a high-tax country or a low-tax country. 
One case in which an AMT firm facing the 90 percent limitation would still 
have a tax incentive to repatriate earnings is if  it had regular NOL carryfor- 
wards that would otherwise expire unused.'* (In this case the firm's regular 
marginal tax rate is zero rather than 34 percent.) By repatriating an additional 
dollar of  foreign earnings, the firm can essentially  convert the expiring tax 
shield into a regular foreign tax credit with a new five-year carryforward pe- 
riod. The cost to the firm of preserving this tax shield is the 2-cent payment of 
AMT today, less the present value of the 2-cent AMT credit the firm will claim 
in a future year. 
Rows  1 and 3 of table 6.3 summarize the tax cost of earnings repatriations 
for firms in an excess credit position for regular tax purposes but subject to the 
90 percent limitation for the AMT. 
6.4.2  Excess Limit Positions 
TL -  0.18. 
We initially assume the firm is in an excess limit position for both the regular 
tax and the AMT. Under the regular tax, an additional dollar of earnings repa- 
triations reduces regular tax liability by r" -  0.34 (assuming the firm  is sub- 
ject to the 34 percent regular  tax rate).  Earnings repatriated  from high-tax 
countries (P  >  0.34) thus lower current regular tax liability. 
For a firm on the AMT, tentative minimum tax is reduced by r" -  0.20 from 
the additional earnings.  Since AMT reflects the difference between  regular 
tax liability and tentative minimum tax, AMT declines by  14 cents. Total cur- 
17. The firm could he marginally constrained on its use of NOL deductions due to the 90 percent 
limitation. In this case, the following description of the change in AMT liability continues to hold, 
but AMT NOL deductions carried to another year would decline by 90 cents and AMT foreign tax 
credits carried to another year would increase by P. 
18. A similar incentive exists if AMT NOLs would expire. Regular tax and AMT NOL deduc- 
tions may he carried back three years and carried forward fifteen years. 165  Alternative Minimum Tax 
rent tax liability, the sum of regular tax liability and AMT, thus declines by 
r* -  0.20. 
The incentive for earnings repatriation is greater for a firm on the AMT. The 
reduction in current tax payments is 14 cents larger than for a firm facing only 
the regular tax. Current tax payments decline for any P  >  0.20. The additional 
14-cent savings today comes at a cost of a 14-cent reduction in the AMT credit 
that could be claimed at a later date. 
The first two rows of table 6.4 summarize the tax cost of earnings repatria- 
tions for firms in an excess limit position for regular tax purposes. 
6.4.3 
The incentive to repatriate earnings while in an excess limit position could 
lead to a situation in which a firm is in an excess limit position for regular tax 
purposes,  but is in an excess credit position  on the AMT due to either the 
conventional limitation or the 90 percent limitation on foreign tax credits. As 
explained below, it is also possible for the firm to be in excess credit for regular 
tax purposes but excess limit for the AMT. 
First, we consider the case of a firm that is in an excess limit position for 
regular tax purposes, but is in excess credit under the AMT due to the conven- 
tional limit. Such a firm lowers its regular tax liability by P -  0.34 from an 
additional  dollar of earnings, but  its tentative minimum  tax liability  is un- 
changed. Since AMT is the difference between  tentative minimum tax  and 
regular tax, AMT rises by r* -  0.34, leaving total current tax liability-the 
sum of  regular  tax and AMT-unchanged.  The additional AMT results  in 
AMT credits of P -  0.34. A firm in this position faces no current cost for 
earnings repatriations. Foreign tax credits limited under the AMT may be car- 
ried to another year. The only cost of earnings repatriation is if the firm antici- 
pates prolonged AMT status and expects to be in an AMT excess credit posi- 
tion in these years. In this instance, if P  > 0.20, the AMT foreign tax credit 
carryfonvards might expire unused, and the firm might have been better off 
deferring these earnings until it could make use of the AMT foreign tax credits. 
(If P  < 0.20, the AMT firm benefits from using up AMT foreign tax credits 
that would otherwise have expired unused.) 
Different Regular and AMT Credit Positions 




Current Tax Price  AMT Credit  Carry  forwards 
1. Regular tax firm  .34 -  i-  n.a.  n.a. 
AMTposition 
2. Excess limit  .20 -  r*  -.14  n.a. 
3. Excess credit  0  r* -  .34  r* -  .20 
4. 90 Percent limitation  .02  i- -  .34 + .02  r; -  .18 166  Andrew B. Lyon and Gerald Silverstein 
Second, we consider the 90 percent limitation. An additional dollar of for- 
eign earnings affects regular tax liability as described above for an excess limit 
firm, decreasing regular tax liability by P -  0.34. Under the AMT, the addi- 
tional earnings will increase tentative minimum tax by  2 cents. This occurs 
because only 90 percent of the additional minimum tax liability may be offset 
with AMT foreign tax credits. As a result, total current tax liability increases 
by  2 cents. The savings in current tax liability relative to the regular tax are 
0.32 - P.  As a result, AMT credits decline by  this amount. Relative to the 
firm’s  regular excess limit tax status, the AMT provides the firm a low-cost 
opportunity to repatriate earnings from foreign countries with low P  (i.e., F 
< 0.32). 
These two cases are summarized in rows 3 and 4 of table 6.4. 
Finally, we consider the case of a firm that is in an excess credit position for 
regular tax purposes but is in  an  excess limit position under the AMT. This 
situation could arise where the firm has regular foreign tax credit carryfor- 
wards (or NOL deductions) but these carryforwards do not exist under the 
AMT. Such a firm faces no increase in regular tax liability from an additional 
dollar of foreign earnings. AMT liability increases by 0.20 -  F.  As a result, 
earnings repatriated from countries with P  > 0.20 can lower current AMT 
liability. The reduction in AMT reduces the firm’s AMT credit by an  equivalent 
amount. This case is considered in row 4 of table 6.3. 
6.4.4  Summary of Repatriation Incentives 
In summary, this section has identified a number of cases under which earn- 
ings repatriation is favored for AMT status relative to regular tax status. Table 
6.5 provides a side-by-side comparison of the possible current tax prices faced 
by  regular tax and AMT firms. For firms with AMT status, the incentive for 
earnings repatriation relative to regular tax status is noted in parentheses be- 
neath the tax price.  l9 
In  only one of  the six possible combinations of tax prices is the AMT tax 
price greater than the regular tax price for all possible foreign tax rates (P): 
where the firm faces the 90 percent limitation on foreign tax credits under the 
AMT but for regular tax purposes is in an excess credit position. Even in this 
case, the firm faces only a 2-cent tax per dollar of repatriated earnings. 
In four cases, the AMT tax price is less than the regular tax price for some 
foreign tax rates. In the remaining case, the tax prices are identical. 
The analysis in this section suggests that in general the AMT offers firms 
19. Because the AMT only alters the timing of tax payments by  the firm  (AMT credits may be 
carried forward for an unlimited duration), the present value of the deviation between the regular 
tax price and the AMT tax price is a function of both the current tax price and the present value 
of the change in AMT credits (as well as the change in foreign tax credit canyfonuards). Devia- 
tions in the current  tax price are therefore more meaningful the longer the period  that a firm 
remains subject to the AMT and the longer the firm’s foreign tax credit position for regular tax 
purposes remains unchanged. 167  Alternative Minimum Tax 
Table 6.5  Summary of Current Tax Prices and Incentives for Dividend 
Repatriation Relative to Regular Tax Status 
Regular Tax Position 
AMT Position  Excess Limit  Excess Credit 
No AMT liability  .34 - P  0 
Excess limit  .20 - r 
(advantageous) 
.20 -  T* 
(advantageous for r* > .20) 
90 Percent limitation  .02  .02 
(advantageous for F  < .32) 
(advantageous for T* < .34) 
(slight penalty) 
(neutral) 
Excess credit  0  0 
the opportunity for low-cost earnings repatriations. The next section presents 
data on the extent of AMT liability among multinationals and on their foreign 
earnings repatriations while on the AMT. 
6.5  Tax Return Data of MNCs 
Using Internal Revenue Service tax return information, we are able to exam- 
ine the prevalence of AMT status among MNCs. We  are further able to exam- 
ine the receipt of foreign-source income by these multinationals to explore the 
possibility that these firms alter their pattern of  income repatriation to take 
advantage of the timing opportunities made possible by AMT status. 
6.5.1  Data Description 
The data used in this analysis are from the 1990 Internal Revenue Service 
Statistics of Income microdata files. 'Wo  primary files are used. Data concern- 
ing general characteristics of  firms such as assets and tax liabilities are ob- 
tained from the corporate 1120 file. Data relating to foreign-source income and 
the credit position of firms with foreign tax credits are from the corporate 11 18 
file. Both files contain tax information prior to audit or amendment of  the 
return. 
The  1120 file consists of  a stratified sample of  the corporate population. 
Pass-through entities such as S-corporations, regulated investment companies, 
and real estate investment trusts are excluded from our analysis.2o  Firms with 
partial-year returns are also excluded. The remaining data represent 2,040,110 
corporations consisting of approximately 55,000 actual observations. All cor- 
porations with more than $250 million in assets are included in the sample, 
while corporations in lower asset categories are sampled at a rate varying from 
20. Pass-through entities do not pay minimum tax, although the recipients of the income may 
owe minimum tax based on their own  taxable income from all sources. 168  Andrew B. Lyon and Gerald Silverstein 
50 to 0.25 percent. The sample includes taxpayers filing returns with account- 
ing periods ending between July 1990 and June 1991. 
Corporations included in the  11 18 file consist of those corporations on the 
11  20 file that additionally claimed a foreign tax credit on form 11  1  8.21  An AMT 
firm that claims foreign tax credits against its regular tax liability  will file a 
form 11  18. A separate form indicating foreign tax credits used against AMT is 
not required to be filed. We estimate the foreign tax credit position for AMT 
purposes  by  substituting the appropriate AMT variables  for the regular tax 
counterparts in the limitation calculation of form 11  18. The AMT variables are 
taken from the AMT tax form, form 4626. 
A number of corporations that receive foreign-source income do not file a 
form  1118. Such firms may be in a net operating loss position  or may have 
other credits or NOL carryforwards that reduce their tax liability to zero, even 
before the use of foreign tax credits. The data in this paper regarding repatri- 
ated foreign-source income consist only of those firms that claimed a foreign 
tax credit. 
6.5.2  AMT Status of Recipients of Foreign-Source Income 
Table 6.6 shows AMT incidence for all corporations and for form 1118- 
filing corporations in  1990. While only  1-2  percent of all corporations incur 
AMT liability, a  significantly  higher percentage  of  larger  corporations  pay 
AMT.  Of  corporations  with  assets  in  excess  of  $50 million,  24.6 percent 
paid AMT. Among form  11  18 filers with assets in excess of $50 million, 28.1 
percent paid AMT. AMT incidence is even more prevalent among the largest- 
asset category, those with assets in excess of $500 million. Among all corpora- 
tions in this largest-asset category, 30.6 percent paid AMT. Of form l 118 filers 
in this largest-asset category, 33.3 percent paid AMT.22 
Table 6.7 presents the same information,  but weights each firm by  its re- 
ported assets.23  Because AMT incidence is increasing with asset size, a larger 
fraction of total assets is affected by the AMT than suggested by the number 
of firms paying AMT. Nearly 40 percent of all assets reported by corporations 
are owned by firms paying AMT. Among form 11 18 filers, AMT incidence is 
21. Recall that the 1120 file is a stratified sample, but includes all firms with greater than $250 
million in assets. Firms in this asset category account for over 90 percent of foreign tax credits. 
As a result, the stratification method is unlikely to result in significant sampling error of foreign- 
source income. 
22. Nonfinancial corporations and corporations in finance and real estate were also examined 
separately. Among nonfinancial corporations with more than $500 million in assets and filing a 
form  1118, 31.2 percent paid AMT. Of the financial corporations in this asset category filing a 
form 1118, 38.8 percent paid AMT. 
23. It  should be noted that for corporations with foreign subsidiaries, reported assets deviate 
even more substantially from replacement cost than for domestic firms. This is because the value 
of the foreign  subsidiary is  carried  by  the parent firm  at  the historic cost of  the equity in the 
subsidiary. In addition to the deviation between current cost and historic cost of the original physi- 
cal assets in the subsidiary, the value of accumulated retained earnings within the foreign subsid- 
iary is not accounted for in the parent’s books. Table 6.6  Counts of Corporations by  Size, AMT Status, and Form 1118 Status, 1990 (counts in units) 
AMT Incidence: 
All Corporations  AMT Payers  Percentage of AMT Payers 
Total Number  Form 11  18 Filers  Total Number  Form  11  18 Filers  Among All Corporations  Among Form 
11 18 Filers  Asset Size Classa 




































































































“Classes consist of  asset sizes greater than or equal to the lower limit and strictly less than the upper limit. Table 6.7  Assets of Corporations by Size, AMT Status, and Form 1118 Status, 1990 (billion $) 
~  ~  ~~  ~~  ~  ~~  ~  ~ 
AMT Incidence: 
All Corporations  AMT Payers  Percentage of AMT Payers 
Total Assets  Form  1 11  8 Filers  Total Assets  Form  1 11  8 Filers  Among All Corporations  Among Form 
Asset Size Class' 
(thousand $)  Assets  Percentage of Total  Assets  Percentage of Total 
11  18 Filers 



































































































"See table 6.6 for definition of asset size classes. 171  Alternative Minimum Tax 
significantly greater when  weighted by  assets. Fifty-three percent of  assets 
owned by form 11  18 filers are owned by those paying AMT. While only about 
830 form 11 18 filers pay AMT, their assets account for just under 53 percent 
of the assets owned by AMT payers.24 
The upper panel  of  table 6.8 shows foreign-source income and foreign- 
source income as a share of  assets for form 11  18 filers paying regular tax and 
paying AMT. In  total, 56 percent of  all foreign-source income is earned by 
AMT firms. As a result, incentives for the receipt of the majority of foreign- 
source income are governed by the rules and tax rates affecting the AMT rather 
than the regular tax. 
The upper panel of table 6.8 can also be used to examine whether a greater 
share of foreign-source income is reported by  form 11  18 filers subject to the 
AMT than would be expected based on the share of  assets reported by  these 
firms. As noted earlier, the measure of  assets used here may  understate the 
current value of foreign subsidiary assets. In addition, because the measure of 
assets also includes the book value of  domestic assets, the ratio of  foreign- 
source income to assets should not be interpreted as the return on a firm’s 
foreign assets. 
In aggregate, there does not appear to be a significant difference in the ratio 
of foreign-source income to assets between AMT firms and non-AMT firms. 
For example, foreign-source income constitutes 1.3  1 percent of assets for non- 
AMT payers and 1.49 percent of assets for AMT payers, a difference of only 
14 percent. Of  form 1118 filers with assets less than $500 million, however, 
foreign-source income of  non-AMT firms constitutes 2.47 percent of  assets, 
while for the AMT firms foreign-source income constitutes 6.48 percent of 
assets, a strikingly large difference of more than 150 percent. 
The bottom panel of  table 6.8 presents the same data for foreign-source 
dividends  (except  deemed   dividend^).^^  Foreign-source  dividends  can  be 
viewed as a relatively more discretionary component of  foreign income and 
therefore may better represent the voluntary repatriation of income by the U.S. 
parent. A story similar to that in the top panel holds. In aggregate, foreign- 
source dividends account for 0.86 percent of assets for non-AMT corporations 
and for only 0.72 percent of  assets for AMT firms. The fact that dividends 
compose a higher percentage of assets for non-AMT firms than for AMT firms 
is entirely the result of dividends received by the highest asset category. When 
24. Of nonfinancial corporations filing a form 11 18, 50.0 percent of the assets were owned by 
AMT payers. Of the financial corporations filing a form  1118, 55.8 percent of the assets were 
owned by AMT payers. 
25. Deemed dividends are nondiscretionary in the sense that they must be reported by the parent. 
(Firms have some planning opportunity on whether to choose to earn income that would be classi- 
fied as a deemed dividend.) Nondeemed dividends may therefore represent the income flow over 
which the parent has the most control. Note that in certain asset categories the quantity of  divi- 
dends reported in the bottom panel of table 6.8 significantly exceeds the net foreign-source income 
reported in the top panel. This appears to be due to the reporting of expenses that reduce foreign- 
source income below the amount of  dividends received. Table 6.8  Foreign-Source Income and Foreign-Source Dividends (except deemed) of Form 1118 Filers by Size and AMT Status 
Foreign-Source Income/Assets (%)  Foreign-Source Income of  Form 11 I8 Filers (million $) 
All Corporations  Non-AMT Payers  AMT Payers  All Corporations  Non-AMT Payers  AMT Payers 
Asset Size Classa 
(thousand $)  Total  At 90% Limit  Other  Total  At 90% Limit  Other 
0-50,OOO  967  524  443  386  57  4.50  3.06  10.10  32.78  1.76 
50,ooO-100,OOO  488  240  249  222  27  2.68  1.74  5.65  12.44  1.02 
100,000-250,000  1,664  1,148  516  420  97  2.84  2.60  3.60  8.80  1.01 
250,000-500,OOO  2,860  1,304  1,556  1,394  162  3.83  2.37  7.96  17.21  1.41 
0-500,OOO  5,979  3,216  2,763  2,422  341  3.46  2.47  6.48  15.30  1.27 
500,OOO+  82,423  35,556  46,867  16,968  29,899  1.35  1.26  1.42  2.04  1.22 
Total  88,402  38,772  49,630  19,390  30,240  1.41  1.31  1.49  2.29  1.22 
Foreign-Source Dividends (except deemed) (million $)  Foreign-Source Dividends (except deemed)/Assets (70) 
All Corporations  Non-AMT Payers 
Asset Size Classa 
(thousand $) 
0-50.000  346  97 
50,ooO-l00,OM)  145  57 
100,OOO-250,000  530  327 
250,000-500,000  1,300  620 
AMT Payers  All Corporations  Non-AMT Payers  AMT Payers 
Total  At 90% Limit  Other  Total  At 90% Limit  Other 
249  141  107  6.48  2.47  17.68  30.18  11.44 
89  58  30  2.42  1.34  4.92  6.28  3.47 
202  158  44  2.15  1.77  .oo  5.62  1.33 
68  I  563  118  3.45  2.18  7.33  12.01  2.55 
0-500,ooO  2,320  1,100  1,220  92  1  299  3.15  2.00  6.55  10.34  3.08 
5oo,OOO+  36,463  17,618  18,845  9,603  9,242  .75  .83  .68  1.18  .47 
Total  38,784  18,719  20,065  10,524  9,541  .78  .86  .72  1.28  .49 
"See table 6.6 for definition of asset size classes. 173  Alternative Minimum Tax 
only form 11  18 firms with less than $500 million in assets are examined, divi- 
dends are found to constitute 2.00 percent of assets for the non-AMT firms and 
6.55 percent of  assets for the AMT firms, or a rate more than 200 percent 
higher for the AMT firms. 
One would like to examine the form 11  18 filers in more detail, together with 
better information on their foreign subsidiary assets, before reaching definitive 
conclusions on how the AMT changes their behavior regarding the receipt of 
foreign income. For example, in the case of  the smaller form 11 18 filers, we 
need to distinguish between two hypotheses: (1) because these firms were sub- 
ject to the AMT they increased their receipt of foreign income versus (2) these 
firms were subject to the AMT, but for reasons exogenous to the AMT treat- 
ment of foreign-source income chose to repatriate income. The second hypoth- 
esis may be true for a number of reasons. Consider the possibility that AMT 
status is indicative of low earnings and that these firms may be cash-flow con- 
strained. It might not be unreasonable to expect that a cash-flow-constrained 
firm would seek to increase its repatriation of foreign income. The fact that 
low cash flow and AMT status are correlated may falsely imply that the AMT 
status encouraged repatriations.26 
6.5.3  Foreign Credit Position of AMT Taxpayers 
As described in section 6.4, the tax price of foreign-source income for AMT 
firms, and the advantage of  dividend repatriation  while subject to the AMT 
relative to the regular tax system, depends on both the foreign tax credit posi- 
tion for regular tax purposes and that for the AMT. As summarized earlier in 
table 6.5, six potential tax price differentials exist for a firm subject to the 
AMT. In table 6.9, we group form 1118 filers into these six AMT cells (and 
two regular tax cells for non-AMT taxpayers)27  based on the foreign tax credit 
position of the firms. The chart separates firms with zero regular taxable in- 
come from those with positive regular taxable income. Firms  with current 
losses or NOLs are “generically” excess credit firms for regular tax purposes 
(an additional dollar of foreign-source income will not give rise to regular tax 
liability) and thus face the same incentives as any other excess credit firms for 
regular taxes, but it is useful to distinguish among these firms for AMT pur- 
poses. The foreign tax credit position shown in table 6.9 is for the basket cate- 
gory accounting for the largest share of the firm’s foreign-source income.28  The 
26. Using other data, Hines and Hubbard (1990)  find a strong correlation between foreign sub- 
sidiary dividend payments and parent dividend payments that might be suggested by  a cash-flow 
constraint of the parent firm.  Altshuler and Newlon (1993) find that the relationship of foreign 
subsidiary dividend payments to the parent is accounted for by a fixed effect for the parent, rather 
than by the level of parent dividend payments. 
27. Note that even regular taxpayers can face the same incentives as an AMT payer to the extent 
that they  are prevented from using AMT credits or other business credits to reduce regular tax 
liability below tentative AMT. We hope to separately identify these firms in later work. 
28. For parent firms that are classified as nonfinancial firms, this basket is nearly always the 
general limitation basket. This basket accounts for about 90 percent of the foreign-source income 174  Andrew B. Lyon and Gerald Silverstein 
Table 6.9  Foreign Tax Credit Position of Form 1118 Filers, 1990 
Position for Regular Taxes 
Excess Credit 
AMT Position  Excess Limit  No Regular Taxes  Regular Taxes  Total 
~ 
1.743  366  1,908  4,017 
No AMT liability  35.95  7.55  39.36 
Excess limit 
120  28 
2.48  .58 
0  148 
.oo 
12  114  42  168 
At 90 percent limit  .25  2.35  37 
60  112  343  515 
Excess credit  1.24  2.31  7.08 
Total  1,935  620  2,293  4,848 
Nore: Top number in cell is count in units; bottom number is count as a percentage of total number 
of  form  11  18 filers. 
credit position is based on the last dollar of foreign-source income received for 
the basket. 
First, we consider firms with a regular tax excess credit position and with a 
positive amount of regular tax. None of these firms are in an excess limit posi- 
tion for the AMT, as anticipated given the lower AMT statutory rate. Approxi- 
mately 90 percent of  these firms that face AMT liability also have excess cred- 
its for purposes of  the AMT and thus face the same marginal incentives for 
dividend repatriation (343 of  385 firms). The remaining 10 percent of these 
firms that pay AMT (42 firms) are subject to the 90 percent limitation. These 
firms pay an extra tax of 2 cents at the margin for each dollar of foreign-source 
income, relative to their regular tax liability. 
Table 6.10 displays the amount of foreign-source income for the same cells 
as shown in table 6.9. The 42 firms subject to the 90 percent limitation account 
for approximately 13 percent of  all foreign-source income earned by  form 
1118  corporations  ($11.34  billion/$88.40  billion)  and  23  percent  of  the 
foreign-source income received by AMT payers. A maximum of $227 million 
in extra current-year AMT tax payments are made by these firms because of 
the 90 percent limitation (0.02 times $11.34 billion), since these firms would 
otherwise be in an excess credit position.29  Firms in an excess credit position 
received by nonfinancial firms. Most of the remaining income for these firms appears in the passive 
basket. For financial firms, the basket selected is the financial services income basket. This basket 
accounts for 88 percent of the foreign-source  income received by  these firms. 
29. This amount is a maximum cost because some of the foreign-source income may be fully 
shielded by  foreign tax credits. It is only true at the margin that an additional dollar of  foreign- 
source income increases tax liability by  2 cents. Additional analysis indicates that the firms with 
foreign-source income facing the 90 percent limitation on the use of foreign tax  credits against 175  Alternative Minimum Tax 
Table 6.10  Foreign-Source  Income of Form 1118 Filers by Foreign Tax Credit 
Position, 1990 
Position for Regular Taxes 
Excess Credit 
AMT Position  Excess Limit  No Regular Taxes  Regular Taxes  Total 
22,995 
No AMT liability  26.01 
4,225 
Excess limit  4.18 
2,657 














15,570  38,772 
17.61 
0  4.76 I 
.oo 
1 1,343  18,012 
12.83 
23,505  26,858 
26.59 
50,417  88,402 
Note: Top number in each cell is foreign-source income in million dollars; bottom number is this 
income as a percentage of  total foreign-source income earned by form 11 18 filers. 
for both AMT and regular tax purposes account for 27 percent of all foreign- 
source income and 47 percent of the foreign-source income earned by  AMT 
payers. 
Next we consider firms with zero regular taxable income and positive AMT 
liability. A small number-about  11 percent, or 28 firms-are  in an excess 
limit position for the AMT. These firms have an incentive to repatriate income 
from countries with P  >  0.20. Less than 1 percent of foreign-source income 
is attributable to these 28 firms. A larger number of  firms and  amount of 
foreign-source income is subject to the 90 percent limitation. About 4.5 per- 
cent of total foreign-source income and 8 percent of the foreign-source income 
of AMT payers is in this cell. Extra tax payments resulting from this limitation 
are a maximum of $80 million. 
Finally, we consider firms in an excess limit position for regular tax pur- 
poses. A significant number of these firms also are in an excess limit position 
under the AMT. By being subject to the AMT, these firms save in the current 
year 14 cents per dollar of foreign-source income received. About 9 percent of 
the foreign-source income received by  AMT payers  accrues to these firms. 
These firms save approximately $590 million in current-year taxes on their 
foreign-source income as a result of being subject to the lower AMT tax rate. 
Another significant group of the firms in excess limit for regular tax purposes, 
accounting for about 6 percent of the foreign-source income received by AMT 
payers, is in an excess credit position under the AMT. This group of firms saves 
AMT are facing the constraint primarily because of the large amount of foreign tax credits avail- 
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the difference between 34 percent and their average foreign tax credit rate (a 
number in excess of 20 percent) on each dollar of foreign-source income re- 
ceived. Finally, a slightly smaller share of the excess limit firms for regular tax 
purposes, 5 percent of the foreign-source income received by AMT payers, is 
subject to the 90 percent limitation on foreign tax credits. The 90 percent limi- 
tation still results in lower U.S. tax payments, by the amount that the average 
foreign tax rate is less than 32 percent per dollar of foreign-source income re- 
ceived. 
In  sum, it appears that total payments of tax on foreign-source income are 
lower for AMT firms than if they were subject to the regular tax rules. The 
analysis, however, has been unable to determine whether the increased incen- 
tive to receive foreign-source income actually significantly affects repatriation 
behavior. While the data in table 6.8 indicate that smaller firms on the AMT 
appear to have higher rates of repatriation of foreign income, it is indeterminate 
whether this is the result of a tax price advantage of AMT status or whether 
higher rates of  repatriation are correlated with other factors leading to AMT 
status. Extension of the single-period analysis over a number of years for firms 
in our sample and linking the parent-firm tax returns with information returns 
on the foreign subsidiaries (form 5471) will allow us to better examine alterna- 
tive hypotheses. 
6.6  Conclusions 
This paper has shown the extent to which incentives of U.S.-based MNCs 
are affected by the AMT. More than half of all foreign-source income in 1990 
was received by corporations subject to the AMT. As a result, the tax prices on 
foreign-source income created by  the AMT may be at least as important as 
those created by  the regular tax. While data shown in Gerardi et al. (1994) 
indicate that AMT incidence for the largest corporations in 1990 was approxi- 
mately 25 percent greater than in  1989 or 1991, the large stock of unclaimed 
AMT credits accumulated by corporations suggests that the incentives created 
by the AMT will continue to be an important factor in the future. As shown in 
section 6.3, the AMT may create an incentive for AMT firms to invest abroad 
rather  than  domestically.  For firms  interested  in  repatriating  income  from 
abroad, the AMT may create a temporary timing opportunity that allows repa- 
triation of this income at a lower cost than if the firms were subject to the rules 
of the regular tax system. These two different incentives may have an ambigu- 
ous overall effect on U.S. domestic investment if repatriated income is retained 
by  the parent  in the United States. Alternatively, the two incentives together 
may suggest that the AMT provides an opportunity for firms to repatriate in- 
come from foreign locations with poor reinvestment opportunities and to rein- 
vest the funds abroad in different foreign locations with better opportunities to 
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Section 6.5 presents data on the different repatriation patterns of AMT firms 
and non-AMT firms. There is a general tendency for both AMT firms and non- 
AMT firms with assets under $500 million to repatriate a larger amount of 
foreign-source income (relative to the assets of the firm) than for the largest 
MNCs. The smaller AMT firms, however, receive a significantly higher share 
of  foreign-source income than their non-AMT counterparts. It appears that 
larger firms, those with assets in excess of $500 million, may find permanent 
deferral of foreign-source income more advantageous than the temporary tim- 
ing advantage offered by  the AMT. The differences in behavior between the 
largest firms and the smaller firms may be consistent with the view that the 
smaller firms face  cash-flow  constraints on  their  investment  opportunities 
while the larger firms either have sufficient cash flow to undertake new invest- 
ment or can raise outside funds at a relatively low cost. We  hope in future 
research to examine more closely the differences in repatriation behavior be- 
tween AMT firms and non-AMT firms, and to make use of information re- 
ported by the foreign subsidiaries of the U.S. parents to determine whether the 
pattern of repatriation from these subsidiaries is consistent with predictions 
about tax-minimizing behavior of the parent firms. 
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Comment  Alan J. Auerbach 
In  terms of  its own language, this paper asks the following question: What 
should the impact of  the AMT on MNCs be, in light of ACE and NOLs? In 
short, it considers the simultaneous impact of several complications to the cor- 
porate income tax on the behavior of U.S.  multinational corporations (MNCs) 
with investments abroad. For a reader not totally immersed in the arcana of the 
tax code, this is a head-spinning journey. But we cannot blame the authors for 
this; they are simply trying to analyze a set of issues made very complicated 
by those who have given us the federal tax code. 
Lyon and Silverstein are to be commended for their careful description of 
how the provisions of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) interact with the 
treatment of foreign-source income. Because the paper does devote so much 
effort to getting the institutional analysis right, let me step backward and offer 
a broad summary of what they are up to. The incentives faced by multinationals 
under the regular income tax are quite complicated and have been the subject 
of study by several authors. Lyon and Silverstein, in the first part of their paper, 
consider how two incentives, to invest abroad and to repatriate earnings from 
abroad, are influenced by  the presence of the corporate AMT. They then go on 
to consider the extent to which the second of these decisions is actually influ- 
enced in practice, by looking at patterns of income repatriation by AMT status. 
The two most important features of the AMT relevant to the current investi- 
gation are its treatment of  depreciation and its nominal tax rate. The AMT 
provisions regarding depreciation are less generous for domestic investment, 
but not for foreign investment, than those of  the regular income tax. Thus, 
firms under the AMT are encouraged to invest relatively more abroad. Second, 
the AMT rate is lower than the regular corporate rate-20  versus 34 percent 
during the time period analyzed. Thus, firms that are not already in an excess 
credit position under the regular income tax, and hence are facing additional 
taxes on repatriated income, will pay  lower taxes on marginal repatriated in- 
come under the AMT. 
There are, of  course, many  additional complications. Some, such as the 
AMT’s limit on the use of  credits to offset taxable income, the authors treat 
explicitly. Others, such as the dynamics of carrying AMT credits forward, they 
mention but ignore. Still, the basic conclusions seem robust to these complica- 
tions. The key question is how important these incentives are in the very com- 
plicated world of international investment and finance. This proves to be a very 
difficult question to answer. 
The authors begin their empirical analysis by  illustrating, in tables 6.6 and 
6.7,  that the AMT could be an important factor, in that it affects a large number 
of firms operating abroad. Weighted by total corporate assets, over half of all 
firms reporting foreign activity are subject to the AMT. It is striking how much 
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the AMT is related to size and foreign activity. Indeed, this highlights one of 
the difficulties the authors face. Their analysis implicitly takes AMT status as 
given, but it clearly is not a random occurrence. To the extent that AMT status 
is correlated with the behavior being considered, this presents problems of in- 
terpretation. 
A  good  illustration  of  this  problem  comes from the  analysis of  foreign- 
source income in table 6.8. The authors argue, based on the theory described 
above, that foreign-source income and, in particular, foreign-source dividends 
should be higher for firms subject to the AMT than those not subject to the 
AMT. They find that, at least as a share of firm assets, this is not the case for 
the groups as a whole, but is true for smaller firms. But recall that smaller firms 
are less likely to be subject to the AMT, so there is clearly a sample selection 
issue here. Moreover, smaller firms (with assets less than $50 million), both 
those subject to the AMT and those that are not, have much higher ratios of 
repatriated dividends to assets (17.68 and 2.47 percent, respectively) than do 
firms of all sizes (0.86 and 0.78 percent), suggesting that there is much more 
behind the curtain than on stage. 
A second, related problem with this analysis is the denominator it uses to 
measure how much income firms are repatriating. The assets to which foreign- 
source dividends and income are being compared are the multinational’s total 
assets, not its foreign assets. Unless foreign assets as a share of total assets is 
independent of AMT status-which  is doubtful given how the AMT works- 
it is not clear how the comparative ratios should be interpreted. 
The preceding analysis looks at different firms and asks whether those under 
the AMT repatriate more income than those not subject to the AMT. The impli- 
cation is that AMT firms face a lower tax on repatriations than otherwise iden- 
tical firms not under the AMT would. However, the paper’s final set of  statis- 
tics, in tables 6.9 and 6.10, casts doubt on this assumption. 
This conclusion  can be  demonstrated  most clearly by  the density  in  the 
lower right-hand corner of  table 6.10, which weights by firm size. This table 
indicates that most firms subject to the AMT are already in an excess credit 
position under the regular income tax-they  pay no taxes on marginal repatria- 
tions of  income. Virtually all such firms either remain in this position under 
the AMT or actually face limits on the use of credits to offset income, causing 
marginal taxes to rise slightly above zero. Hence, for the bulk of multinational 
firms subject to the AMT-about  80 percent, weighted by foreign-source in- 
come-falling  under the AMT delivers no tax incentive at all for repatriations. 
In summary, the paper has made an important contribution in carefully indi- 
cating the potential incentives for the generation and repatriation of  foreign- 
source  income.  By  showing  how  large  a  share  of  the  corporate  sector 
falls under the AMT, particularly those firms operating abroad, it offers con- 
vincing proof  that we need to think more about the AMT than  many  of  us 
have in  the  past.  However, the  empirical  results  still  leave plenty  of  room 
for argument about what the behavioral  effects of the AMT actually are in 
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